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Abstract. How should we characterise the relations between environmental scarcity, 
confl ict, and migration? Most academic and policy analyses conclude that scarcities of  
environmental resources can have signifi cant impacts upon confl ict and migration, and 
claim or imply that within the context of  accelerating global environmental changes these 
impacts are likely to become more signifi cant still. Many analyses admittedly recognise that 
these impacts are often indirect rather than direct and that there exist multiple ‘drivers’ of  
confl ict and migration, of  which environmental stresses are but one. We argue that even 
these qualifi cations do not go far enough, however: they still overstate the current and 
likely future signifi cance of  environmental changes and stresses in contributing to confl ict 
and migration and underemphasise a far more important causal pathway—from 
confl ict and migration to environmental vulnerabilities. These arguments are advanced via 
a comparative analysis of  water–migration–confl ict linkages in Cyprus and Israel and the 
West Bank and Gaza.
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Introduction
In recent years there has been renewed academic and policy attention to the question of 
the relations between environmental scarcities and stresses, on the one hand, and confl ict 
and migration, on the other. Western policy and military establishments, in particular, have 
expressed mounting concern that climate-change-related environmental changes may foment 
civil strife, undermine state capacities, exacerbate existing international security challenges, 
and increase migration fl ows to the Global North (CNA, 1997; CSIS and CNAS, 2007). 
Some make far more deterministic claims about this than others: some envisage a future of 
‘climate wars’ (Dyer, 2010) and ‘climate refugees’ (Christian Aid, 2007; Myers, 1995), whilst 
others insist that environmental stresses are unlikely to be more than contributory factors to 
confl ict and migration and that the latter always have multiple drivers (Black et al, 2011a). 
Yet, for all these important differences in emphasis, most academic literature and virtually all 
policy discourse on the subject is of the view that there do exist important linkages between 
environmental change, migration, and confl ict—and that these linkages are likely to intensify 
and multiply in coming decades. 
This paper provides a critical assessment of this mainstream ‘environmental security’ and 
‘environmental migration’ thinking, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, 
we build upon existing anti-Malthusian scholarship to argue that most mainstream discourse 
overstates the current and likely future signifi cance of environmental changes and stresses 
in contributing to confl ict and migration, and underemphasises a far more important causal 
pathway—from confl ict and migration to environmental vulnerabilities. Empirically, we 
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advance this case by focusing on the one resource which is most often associated with confl ict 
and migration—water—examining the linkages between water, confl ict, and migration in two 
water-short contexts: Cyprus and Israel and the West Bank and Gaza (WBG). The bulk of the 
paper provides a comparative analysis of these two cases, on the strength of this advancing 
a series of generalisable conclusions which are very different from those usually enunciated 
within mainstream environmental confl ict and migration thinking.
In the fi rst main section of the paper we review this mainstream thinking and critiques 
thereof and outline our alternative approach to the study of environment–confl ict–migration 
linkages. Thereafter, we turn to our cases, fi rst providing overviews of the key dimensions 
of confl ict, migration, and water stress in Cyprus and Israel–WBG and then analysing the 
linkages between water and confl ict—and water, confl ict, and migration—in these two 
‘divided environments’ (Selby and Hoffmann, 2014). In conclusion, we summarise and 
tentatively explain the major similarities and differences between the two cases and suggest a 
set of general conclusions with implications well beyond the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Framework and methodology
The dominant line of argument within contemporary academic and especially policy discourse 
on the relations between the environment, confl ict, and migration centres on the fi gure of 
‘scarcity’, understood in Malthusian terms. From a Malthusian perspective, scarcities 
of environmental resources arising from either supply-side problems (whether induced by 
environmental shocks like droughts, by secular declines in levels of, for instance, rainfall, or 
by environmental degradation) or increases in demand (as a result of population growth 
or increases in per capita consumption) can place signifi cant pressures on social systems—in 
turn causing or contributing to, amongst other things, confl ict and migration. Such arguments 
have most often been articulated in relation to water scarcities, water being both essential 
to human existence and in many parts of the world decidedly limited in availability; and 
also being either a ‘common pool’ resource—in which case unregulated access can generate 
‘tragedy of the commons’ scenarios (Hardin, 1968)—or one that can readily be captured 
by upstream actors, especially states, leading to confl ict between upstream and downstream 
riparians (Gleick, 1993; Lowi, 1995). In recent years such Malthusian thinking has also 
often been advanced in analyses of the security implications of global climate change. This 
work has focused above all on the potential impacts of climate change on precipitation 
levels and patterns and on how either long-term declines in rainfall or short-term droughts 
may conceivably generate political violence and/or migration (Gleditsch, 2012, page 4). 
Moreover, much of this work—whether scholarly (IPCC, 2001, page 85; Reuveny, 2007), 
populist (Dyer, 2010), or policy oriented (Christian Aid, 2007; CSIS and CNAS, 2007)—
has emphasised that migration may play a key linkage role between climate-change-induced 
environmental scarcity and confl ict. For instance, Gleditsch et al (2007, page 4) suggest two 
plausible causal pathways from climate change to migration to confl ict, one direct and the 
other indirect (fi gure 1); in both models climate-change-caused environmental stresses are 
considered the defi ning causal variable. 
Notwithstanding the above, there are without doubt many different shades of Malthusianism. 
Some iterations are highly deterministic, depicting environmental and demographic pressures 
confl ict in region A migration from region A confl ict in region B
migration from region A confl ict in region B
Direct effect
Environmental stress
Environmental stress
Indirect effect
↓
↓ ↓ ↓
↓
Figure 1. Gleditsch et al’s (2007) model of environment–migration–confl ict linkages.
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as direct and primary determinants of confl ict and migration—as indicated by claims that the 
wars of the 21st century will be about water (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993) and by the use of 
phrases like ‘climate refugees’ (Myers, 1995). Others portray the links between environmental 
stresses, on the one hand, and confl ict and migration, on the other, as primarily indirect, 
mediated by changes in ‘intervening variables’ such as economic growth (Koubi et al, 2012), 
state and institutional capacities (Kahl, 2006), and human security (Barnett and Adger, 2007). 
Still others emphasise that environmental factors are but one amongst a multiplicity of 
‘drivers of change’, alongside other economic, demographic, political, and social factors 
(Black et al, 2011a). Some analyses are highly alarmist, others much less so. Moreover, while 
some Malthusian accounts draw upon qualitative case studies, many more recent analyses 
present large-N studies (Gleditsch, 2012). Malthusian reasoning can take many different 
forms. What is shared right across this literature, however, is its focus on scarcity as causing 
or exacerbating social and political tensions, including violent confl ict and migration. 
For all its dominance, this Malthusian mainstream has nonetheless been subject to a 
range of critiques. Some have argued, on historical grounds, that evidence of environmental 
confl icts is decidedly thin and, especially in relation to water, that environmental scarcities have 
tended more to facilitate cooperation than to contribute to confl ict (Dinar, 2008; Wolf, 1998). 
Indeed, some contend, on liberal functionalist theoretical grounds (Mitrany, 1975), that 
water and environmental cooperation can potentially catalyse and ‘spill over’ into other 
‘high political’ spheres of peacemaking, effectively leading to peace (Jägerskog, 2009; 
Phillips et al, 2006). Liberal political economists have argued that the historical absence of 
‘water wars’ derives from the fact that water—far from being a nonsubstitutable, fi nite, and 
thereby scarce resource—is readily substitutable, importable, and recyclable: for example, 
through water treatment and reuse or through the importation of ‘virtual water’ in the form 
of commodities that are produced utilising water elsewhere (Allan, 2000). Still others have 
argued that it is high-value resources, from oil to diamonds, which are most associated with 
and conducive to confl ict (Collier and Hoeffl er, 2005; Peluso and Watts, 2001), not low-value 
environmental resources like water, no matter how scarce. Some have critiqued the basic 
conceptual scaffolding of Malthusianism, especially its emphasis on ill-defi ned ‘scarcities’, 
‘population pressures’, and ‘carrying capacities’ (Metha, 2010; Rao, 1994). Last but by no 
means least, some have critiqued this mainstream thinking as ideology or myth, arguing 
that representations of water wars and climate refugees owe more to entrenched Western 
cultural and policy narratives than they do to dispassionate academic analysis (Hartmann, 
2010; Leach and Mearns, 1996).
The approach adopted herein builds upon these various critiques, but offers a distinctive 
contribution in four respects. First, instead of focusing solely on the impacts of environmental 
change on migration and confl ict—that is, analysing environmental stresses as the independent 
variable, and migration and confl ict as dependent variables—we consider environment–
migration–confl ict relations in the round, allowing for the fact that all three of these variables 
may affect one another and, indeed, that the causal impacts of environmental change may be 
much less signifi cant and weighty than those of the other two. It is for this reason that our 
empirical analysis starts not with environmental migration but with a brief elucidation of 
the basic contours of political confl ict in Cyprus and Israel–WBG. Second, our analysis is 
theoretically rooted in historical–materialist political ecology—accepting to a degree liberal 
critiques of Malthusianism but insisting on the structured nature of patterns of environmental 
insecurity; their determination by equally structured patterns of power inequalities, uneven 
development, state formation, geopolitics, and confl ict; and the historical and social specifi city 
of different developmental and political trajectories (Peluso and Watts, 2001). Third, as against 
the case study and large-N research quantitative analyses which dominate the contemporary 
academic literature, we adopt a qualitative comparative method, analysing two comparable 
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cases of water–confl ict–migration relations, identifying signifi cant differences and similarities 
between them, and on the strength of this suggesting some general conclusions about 
environment–migration–confl ict relations. Finally, while the two cases compared here—
Cyprus and Israel–WBG—have individually been the subjects of large volumes of research, 
their water politics have not yet been subjected to comparative analysis. 
Cyprus and Israel–WBG are selected here for comparison partly because they are both 
home to serious problems of water stress but also because of their comparable political and 
economic contexts and histories. They are both often represented as areas of extreme water 
scarcity (WDD, 2003a, page 3) which will face deepening scarcities as a result of climate 
change (Maguder, 2010)—climate change being expected by many to result in marked 
declines in precipitation levels across the Eastern Mediterranean (Brauch, 2011). Both have 
historically been sites of ‘high political’ confl ict and extensive forced displacement and 
voluntary in-migration and out-migration. They thus represent useful cases for assessing 
historical, current, and likely future environment–confl ict–migration linkages. 
Confl ict
The primary axes and causes of confl ict in both Cyprus and Israel–WBG are modern nationalisms, 
and attendant exclusivist and violent processes of state building. Geopolitical developments—
the retreat of the Ottoman and, later, British empires; the Cold War; and more recently the War 
on Terror—and alignments with great powers have been important contextual factors.
The Cyprus confl ict is historically rooted in the rise of mutually reenforcing Greek 
and Turkish nationalisms during the 19th and early 20th centuries, and in the corollary 
emergence of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot national identities. Independent Cyprus’s 
fi rst constitution of 1960 provided for the political representation and participation of the 
20% Turkish Cypriot minority. However, within three years intercommunal violence had 
led to the widespread internal displacement of Turkish Cypriots and their withdrawal from 
state institutions; and in 1974, in the immediate wake of a Greek junta-inspired coup d’état 
deposing the elected Cypriot President, Turkey invaded and occupied the north of the island, 
leading to the expulsion and fl ight of 200 000 Greek Cypriots, plus 34 000 Turkish Cypriots 
living in the south. Since then, Cyprus has been de facto divided between the internationally 
recognised Republic of Cyprus (RoC) on 62% of the island and an internationally isolated 
Turkish Cypriot administration in the north (hereafter, Northern Cyprus). Almost all Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots have gradually been displaced into their respective realms, and a 
territorial and political stalemate has prevailed. In 2002 UN Secretary General Kofi  Annan 
produced a comprehensive plan for reunifi cation, which was accepted in Northern Cyprus 
but was rejected through referendum in the RoC. Talks between the two communities’ leaders 
are ongoing, but are yet to yield tangible results.
Since independence, the RoC has evolved into an economically successful state, 
with especially strong fi nance, tourism, and shipping sectors and a GDP per capita of over 
US $31 000 (World Bank, 2011a). Northern Cyprus, on the other hand, is by virtue of its 
international isolation effectively dependent on the Turkish state, even though it also features 
a sizeable tourism industry. Its GDP per capita is around half that of the RoC, just under 
US $15 000 (TRNC SPO, 2011). Northern Cyprus is heavily militarised, housing 30 000–40 000 
Turkish troops (Bray, 2011, page 79)—this is in comparison with the much smaller number of 
national guards and Greek troops in the RoC. Total fatalities from the Cyprus confl ict between 
1963 and 1974 numbered around 6000; there have been no fatalities since 1974.
The Israeli–Palestinian confl ict, by contrast, is rooted in a settler–colonial encounter—
in the Zionist movement’s settlement of Palestine with British imperial support; in the 
subsequent displacement and dispersion of the indigenous Arab population; and in the reactive 
emergence of Palestinian nationalism (Rodinson, 1973; Shafi r, 1989). Refl ecting its European 
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origins, ever since the 1930s, the Zionist movement has always had at its disposal far superior 
economic, diplomatic, and military resources than its Palestinian counterpart. Thus, following 
the hasty termination of British rule in 1948, the state of Israel was established on 78% of 
Mandate Palestine, with the remaining areas coming under the administration of Jordan 
(the West Bank) and Egypt (the Gaza Strip) and over 750 000 Palestinians, or 85% of the 
native population, being displaced from the area that became Israel (Hurewitz, 1968, pages 
319–321). In 1967 WBG was occupied by Israel, along with the Sinai and Golan Heights. 
Following the 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established, with security and civil powers in the 
Gaza Strip plus 40% of the West Bank (the remaining 60% remaining under exclusive Israeli 
control). Despite the 2001 collapse of the Oslo peace process, these ‘interim’ arrangements 
remain in effect. Since 2007 the PA has been split between an internationally recognised Fatah 
administration in the West Bank and an internationally isolated Hamas administration in Gaza. 
Israel has consolidated into an economically successful state, with especially important 
high-tech, military, and diamond industries. It remains a heavily militarised and nuclear-armed 
though existentially insecure society. It has regularly been embroiled in interstate and cross-
border wars (1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982–2000, 2006) and, since its 1967 capture of 
the WBG, in protracted civil confl ict with Palestinians under occupation (especially 1987–93, 
2000–04, 2008–09). For its part, ever since the PLO’s emergence in the 1960s, the Palestinian 
nationalist movement has been poorly institutionalised, often fragmented, and fi nancially and 
politically dependent on the patronage of outside powers (mainly oil-producer states up to 1990; 
mainly Israel, the US, and the EU since then). It has witnessed large-scale armed confl ict not 
only with Israel but also with neighbouring ‘host states’ (Jordan 1970–71, Lebanon 1975–90) 
and internally between Palestinian factions (especially 1983, 2007). Whereas contemporary 
Israel has a GDP per capita of over US $28 500, the equivalent fi gures for the West Bank and 
Gaza are only US $2000 and US $1100, respectively (World Bank, 2011b; 2012). 
In sum, there are striking similarities as well as differences between the two cases. Both 
confl icts are rooted in modern nationalisms and bear the legacies of Ottoman and especially 
British rule. Both have resulted in, and continue to have at their heart, large-scale population 
displacement (see next section for more detail). Both cases have witnessed territorial division, 
internationally recognised occupations, the international isolation of particular territories, 
and so-far-unsuccessful peace processes. On the other hand, there are two key differences. 
First, with regard to local balances of power, while the Cyprus confl ict is characterised by a 
rough symmetry (or ‘double asymmetry’: the RoC’s international recognition and economic 
prosperity being counterbalanced by Turkish military power in Northern Cyprus), the Israeli–
Palestinian confl ict is highly asymmetrical—in economic, political, and military terms and 
also in relation to patterns of settlement and displacement. And, second, the Israeli–Palestinian 
confl ict has been marked by far higher levels, frequency, and persistency of violence than the 
Cyprus confl ict. These two key differences are clearly related.
Migration
Over the last century Cyprus and Israel–WBG have both been witness to forced displacement, 
state-sanctioned settlement, internal voluntary migration, and international economic and 
refugee migration. Forced displacement has been one of the defi ning features of the Cyprus 
and Israeli–Palestinian confl icts. The Palestinians are a nation of refugees, home to “by far 
the most protracted and largest of all refugee problems in the world today” (UNHCR, 2006, 
page 116). In addition to the 750 000 displaced in 1947–49, around 300 000 Palestinians 
were displaced during the Six Day War of 1967. There are currently 4.8 million registered 
Palestinian refugees, over 2 million of them residing in Jordan and the remainder in Syria, 
Lebanon, and the WBG (UNRWA, 2010); in addition, there are large though contested 
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numbers of both unregistered refugees and internally displaced Palestinians within Israel 
(Rempel, 2006). Of the current 2.5 million population of the West Bank, over 750 000 
are refugees; of the current 1.5 million population of the Gaza Strip, 1.1 million, or 73%, are 
refugees (PCBS, 2011; UNRWA, 2010). 
In Cyprus the two major episodes of forced displacement occurred in 1963, when 25 000 
Turkish Cypriots (24% of the minority population) were displaced into territorial enclaves 
(Sert, 2010, page 240); and in 1974, following the Turkish invasion, when far larger numbers 
were displaced. The RoC considers 208 000 people, or 23% of its population, to be internally 
displaced (IDMC, 2010), while there are estimated to be 65 000 internally displaced Turkish 
Cypriots from 1974 (King and Ladbury, 1982). Both the Northern Cyprus administration and 
the UNHCR consider Cyprus’ internally displaced people settled, however. 
Both Cyprus and Israel–WBG have also been important sites of politically inspired 
and/or state-led immigration and settlement. Israel is no less than the product of Zionist 
immigration and settlement, fi rst from Europe and subsequently from the Middle East, 
North Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Of the current Israeli population of 7.7 million, 
6 million are Jewish immigrants or their descendents (ICBS, 2011). Moreover, many of the 
most distinctive features of Israeli politics and society are products of the specifi c form taken 
by Zionist colonisation and settlement (Shafi r, 1989). Zionism’s settler–immigrant ideology 
has been extended since 1967 into the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), where, with 
direct and indirect state support, over 120 Jewish settlements have been established with a 
total population of over 500 000 (FMEP, 2011). Similarly, since 1974 Turkish government 
support has resulted in extensive immigration from Anatolia to Northern Cyprus. As a 
result, according to the most recent census in 2006, over 27% of Northern Cyprus’s 250 000 
population are Turkish citizens, and over a third of all Turkish Republic of North Cyprus 
citizens are of Turkish origin (Hatay, 2007, page 30). Both Israel’s and Turkey’s movement of 
populations into occupied territories are widely accepted as contravening international law. 
Internal voluntary migration within Cyprus and Israel–WBG has been quite limited. 
Because of both territories’ small size, population centres are readily accessible even 
from rural peripheries, and rural–urban migration has thus been relatively low. Palestinian 
day labour within Israel, which at its peak employed 36% of the WBG labour force, has 
signifi cantly declined since Israel introduced closure policies in the early 1990s, Palestinian 
labour within Israel having been largely replaced by foreign workers. By contrast, Cyprus’s 
2004 EU accession has forced the RoC to open its labour market to Turkish Cypriot day 
labourers, of whom there are around 2000 (Bray, 2011). There has been some locally 
signifi cant internal migration within the West Bank, relating to Israeli closure policies, the 
construction of its ‘separation wall’, and restrictions on development in the 60% of the West 
Bank under its control.
International labour immigration is increasingly important within the RoC and Israel. 
Over most of the period since independence, Cyprus has been a net exporter of migrants. 
Owing to its recent economic prosperity and labour shortages, however, the RoC has 
become a destination for labour migrants from Asia and Eastern Europe, these numbering 
just under 15 000 in 2008 (Trimikliniotis, 2010, page 63). Israel, likewise, has since 1990 
witnessed a sharp increase in foreign workers, chiefl y from China and South and Southeast 
Asia, currently numbering 220 000, 7.5% of the total labour force (Cohen and Cohen, 
2011, page 154). In addition, both the RoC and especially Israel are home to small but 
signifi cant international refugee populations of around 9000 (UNHCR, 2011) and 35 000 
(Furst-Nichols and Jacobsen, 2011), respectively.
In many respects, then, there are extensive similarities between the migration patterns 
of Cyprus and Israel–WBG, as one would expect of such proximate territories. However, 
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there do exist signifi cant differences in patterns of migration relating to confl ict. Where in the 
Israeli–Palestinian context there is a striking asymmetry in migration experiences—Zionist 
immigration and settlement contrasting starkly to the record of Palestinian displacement—in 
Cyprus there has been rough equivalence, with minorities from both sides being displaced 
(where there is an asymmetry in Turkish government-backed immigration from Anatolia, 
there being nothing equivalent to this within the RoC). Moreover, while migration, settlement, 
and displacement have been both consequence and constitutive of the Israeli–Palestinian 
confl ict, this is not the case in Cyprus. 
Water availability and management
While both Cyprus and Israel–WBG are often depicted as areas of extreme water scarcity, 
this is at best only half true. Both have primarily Mediterranean climates with highly variable 
interannual precipitation. Nonetheless, annual rainfall reaches 1100 mm in Cyprus’ central 
Troudos massif, with Nicosia, for example, having annual precipitation of 324 mm. Moreover, 
northern Israel, the Golan Heights, and West Bank receive amongst the highest levels of rainfall 
in the Middle East: Jerusalem has annual precipitation of 550 mm, equivalent to that of London. 
This is not to deny that hydrology does pose signifi cant problems, however. While Cyprus 
receives decent levels of precipitation per capita, it nonetheless has no perennial rivers and 
faces natural storage problems owing to the small size of the island and water loss to the 
Mediterranean. Resources are also unevenly distributed, being naturally sparser, given 
topography and precipitation patterns, in Northern Cyprus than in RoC-controlled territory. 
Israel–WBG face less extreme problems of water storage (Lake Tiberias and the West 
Bank Mountain Aquifer serving as large storage reservoirs), but receive signifi cantly less 
precipitation per capita than Cyprus. In addition, water resources are naturally much more 
unevenly distributed in Israel–WBG than in Cyprus, being most abundant in northern Israel 
and the West Bank, and least abundant in the south, including in the Gaza Strip and Negev 
Desert (where rainfall falls to 30 mm). Finally, a far higher proportion of Israel–WBG’s water 
resources are transboundary, this including the two most important sources: the Jordan River (to 
which Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan are also riparians) and the West Bank Mountain Aquifer. In 
each of these respects, Israel–WBG face much the more diffi cult hydrological circumstances. 
Natural shortages are currently mitigated through a range of technological and other 
means, especially in Israel and the RoC. Israel has a highly integrated national supply network, 
which conveys water from the northeast of the country to the coastal plain and Negev Desert in 
the south. The RoC, for its part, has a reservoir capacity of 330 × 106 m3, in per capita terms the 
highest such capacity in the world, refl ecting its natural storage problems. Wastewater recycling 
is increasingly used to provide water for irrigation in Israel and the RoC. Desalination already 
provides Israel with 264 × 106 m3 per year (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012) and the RoC with 
52 × 106 m3 per year (WDD, 2003b, page 3) with further expansion planned: Israel is currently 
constructing a raft of major desalination plants which, once complete, are planned to provide 
750 × 106 m3 per year (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012), more water than provided by the Jordan 
River, while in the RoC desalination is planned to rise to 106.8 × 106 m3 per year (Manoli, 2010, 
page 36). Turkey has started the construction of reservoirs for a suspended water pipeline, with 
an annual capacity of 75 × 106 m3, from its southern shores to Northern Cyprus.(1) Cyprus and 
Israel–WBG also rely heavily on the import of virtual water to maintain their overall water 
balances. By one calculation (for 1999) Israel’s net virtual water imports amount to 6.7 × 109 m3 
annually (Hoekstra and Hung, 2005, page 51), over three times its consumption from local 
natural water sources. Finally, since 1967 Israel has been able to mitigate natural shortages by 
limiting Palestinian access to the Mountain Aquifer, as well as Arab state access to the River 
(1) Author’s personal communication with local residents.
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Jordan, ensuring that it receives the lion’s share of water from these two key transboundary 
resources (Lowi, 1995; Zeitoun, 2008). To different degrees, then, both the RoC and Israel 
have been able to adapt to natural water shortfalls. For a range of political, economic, and 
institutional reasons, this is not the case in Northern Cyprus or the WBG.
The result of the above is that both Israel and to a lesser degree the RoC have, for the most 
part, adequate water provision. Domestic consumption in Israel, 293 litres per capita per day, 
is almost twice as high as in the UK (HSI, 2009; ICBS, 2011).(2) Excess Israeli desalination 
water has until recently been used for irrigation. Indeed, so plentiful are water supplies within 
Israel that the Israeli government now provides, and is legally obliged to provide, water to 
nature (IMEP, 2005). Domestic consumption in the RoC is also high, at around 188 litres 
per capita per day (Iacovides, 2010, pages 24–25). Moreover, irrigated agriculture accounts 
for around 60–70% of total water consumption, the majority of this being for citrus farming, 
despite its limited economic value (Elkiran and Ongul, 2009; WDD, 2010, page 46).
There are major water problems, however. First, there is signifi cant overexploitation of 
water resources in both Cyprus and Israel–WBG. The upper Jordan River is so heavily exploited 
that the lower Jordan River now has only 2% of its natural fl ow; the Dead Sea is consequently 
disappearing (B’Tselem, 2011, page 30). Israel’s Coastal Aquifer is also overabstracted and 
increasingly saline. Gaza’s portion of the Coastal Aquifer is in a critical condition (discussed 
further below). Aquifers are also being depleted across Cyprus. This is especially the case for 
the island’s largest aquifers in Northern Cyprus, where groundwater abstraction by Turkish 
Cypriot farmers is not monitored and only sporadically regulated. The Magosa/Famagusta 
Aquifer has become completely unusable owing to seawater intrusion (Ergil, 2000). The 
transboundary Morphou/Guzelyurt Aquifer, the largest groundwater resource in Cyprus, 
shows a defi cit of around 30 × 106 m3 per year, at a safe yield of 37 × 106 m3 per year (Elkiran 
and Aysen, 2008, page 3). Total groundwater defi cits from overabstraction are estimated at 
26.6 × 106 m3 per year for the RoC (WDD, 2010, page 31) and around 50 × 106 m3 per year for 
Northern Cyprus (Elkiran and Ongul, 2009, page 151).
Second, many water resources are heavily polluted, especially in Israel–WBG. The lower 
Jordan River is now largely sewage. In the WBG neither Palestinian communities nor Israeli 
settlements have adequate sewage collection and treatment infrastructures (B’Tselem, 2009; 
Fischhendler et al, 2011). Many Israeli streams and aquifers have until recently been highly toxic.
Third, there have been and remain serious supply shortfalls. In 2008 a dramatic drop 
in precipitation levels, exacerbated by mismanagement in preceding years, led to an acute 
water crisis in Cyprus (Pashiardis and Michaelides, 2009). State-operated water supplies to 
agriculture were stopped altogether, while domestic and municipal supplies were upheld only 
by water imports from Greece and Turkey. More continuously, since 1967 Palestinian water 
demand in the West Bank has been suppressed in order to maximise Israeli consumption 
from the transboundary Mountain Aquifer. Prior to 1995, suppression of demand was 
achieved principally through military orders (JMCC, 1994). Since then, however, demand 
has additionally been suppressed through the regulations and decisions of the Israeli–
Palestinian Joint Water Committee—which was established as part of the Oslo peace process, 
but which primarily functions as an Israeli veto mechanism, maintaining the water access 
inequalities established prior to the peace process (Selby, 2003a). The consequence is that 
domestic consumption by West Bank Palestinians is 97 litres per capita per day (World Bank, 
2009, page 12), only a third of average Israeli consumption. In addition, there are large 
internal water supply variations between Palestinian communities. While some towns are 
well served, 200 Palestinian villages are not connected to water networks (WASH, 2005); 
and most Palestinian towns and villages experience lengthy summer supply cuts, in some 
(2) The fi gure is for 2007. 
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cases lasting several months (Selby, 2003b, pages 171–181). Agricultural water use has faced 
particularly severe restrictions.
The Gaza Strip, fi nally, is an ecological and humanitarian disaster zone, overabstraction 
of its shallow Coastal Aquifer having led to the signifi cant intrusion of saline water. Natural 
recharge in Gaza plus lateral infl ow from Israel totals 72 × 106 m3 per year, but current 
abstraction is more than double this (Vengosh and Amer, 2005, page 4). This overabstraction 
is a product of three factors: high population density stemming from Gaza’s large refugee 
population; poor regulation, especially since the establishment of the PA in 1994 (since 
when over 5000 shallow wells have been drilled in Gaza); and the negligible volume of 
water supplies received from Israel (5 × 106 m3 per year). Gaza’s groundwater is also highly 
contaminated with sewage and, as a result, nitrates. In consequence, only 5–10% of Gaza’s 
water supply meets potable standards (World Bank, 2009, page 28). Declining water quality 
has had discernible health impacts, Gaza experiencing a high incidence of diarrhoea, in 
particular. Health impacts are unevenly distributed, however; those with fi nancial means 
drink bottled water, and hence it is the poorest who suffer most from Gaza’s water crisis.
Several factors suggest that these problems may worsen in future. Even at current 
rates of abstraction, water and salinity levels in Cyprus, the Israeli Coastal Aquifer, and in 
particular the Gaza Strip will inexorably deteriorate. Moreover, high population growth—
currently 1.8% in Israel and 2.7% in the WBG, though only 0.8% in the RoC—may place 
further pressure on water resources, especially in Gaza. There may be further increases in 
per capita abstraction. Moreover, climate change may further exacerbate water stresses. 
Contrary to some claims (CMS, 2011; Kafl e and Bruins, 2009), there is little solid evidence 
that rainfall levels are already declining (Messerschmid, 2012). Nonetheless, climate change 
models suggest that, on average, precipitation in Cyprus and Israel–WBG will decrease by 
10–19% for 2040–69 relative to 1961–90.(3) In addition, Cyprus and Israel–WBG will almost 
certainly experience increased water loss from evapotranspiration, plus more regular extreme 
weather events. Sea-level rise may also affect local water resources, especially the shallow 
Coastal Aquifer which serves important storage functions for both Israel and Gaza (EQA and 
UNDP, 2010; IMEP, 2010). All that said, climate change is highly unlikely to be the crucial 
determinant of future water stresses and vulnerabilities. Conway’s (2005) fi nding that the 
impacts of global climate change on Nile Basin fl ows will be relatively minor compared 
with changes wrought by population growth, transformation in land use, and development 
strategies is of more general relevance here. Israel’s Second National Communication 
on Climate Change (IMEP, 2010, page 80) predicts reduced agricultural income resulting 
from climate change amounting to US $100 million annually by 2020—but this is equivalent 
to only 0.0097% of Israel’s GDP. For WBG Palestinians the granting of a more equitable 
share of regional water resources would have a much more signifi cant bearing on Palestinian 
water vulnerabilities and insecurities than global climate change is ever likely to have, under 
any established climate change scenario (Messerschmid, 2012).
In addition, supply enhancement (especially wastewater recycling and desalination) 
and demand management measures may help mitigate, or even overcome, these pressures, 
as the evidence on the RoC and Israel above suggests. There are, however, signifi cant 
economic, institutional, and political impediments to actualising these countertendencies. 
Economically, high-technology solutions not only require signifi cant capital investment but 
are also expensive to maintain and operate, to the extent that many are currently beyond 
the means of the WBG, especially the Gaza Strip, even assuming continued support from 
(3) These fi gures are for the B1, A1B, and A2 climate change scenarios and are average fi gures across all 
sixteen global circulation models (GCMs). Note that these fi gures mask a high degree of uncertainty, 
since the individual GCMs generate very different precipitation projections, from no change to a 35% 
decline [scenarios generated from The Nature Conservancy (2011); World Bank (2011c)].
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international donors. Institutionally, both the PA and even more so Northern Cyprus have 
weak administrative and regulatory capacities in the water sector. Politically powerful 
domestic interests (most notably the farming and tourism lobbies in Cyprus) and ideologies 
(such as Israel’s Orientalist commitment to ‘Western’ levels of consumption)(4) are obstacles 
to wise water management. The ongoing confl icts in Cyprus and Israel–WBG are on many 
levels impediments to water security (as discussed in the next section). Finally, it is also 
conceivable that future increases in the price of fossil fuels, or climate change mitigation 
efforts which place limits on fossil fuel consumption, may exacerbate water stresses by 
increasing the cost of, for instance, desalination or virtual water imports.
In summary, neither Cyprus nor Israel–WBG have plentiful natural water resources, 
even if neither are sites of ‘absolute scarcity’. In both cases supply enhancement—made 
possible through investment, high economic development, ‘developmental statism’, and the 
global trade in agricultural staples—has mitigated water shortages and stresses for some 
populations. In both cases, moreover, water stresses are unevenly distributed. Beyond this, 
however, it is the differences between the two cases which stand out. In hydrological terms 
alone, water poses much greater challenges in Israel–WBG than in Cyprus. Moreover, the 
existing water problems in Israel–WBG—specifi cally, the ecological crisis in Gaza and 
continuous supply shortages in the West Bank—are far worse than in Cyprus. Signifi cantly, 
however, these severe water problems are not primarily hydrological in origin. Indeed, 
whereas in Cyprus water stresses correlate broadly with hydrology, in the West Bank the 
reverse is true: here a resource-rich area is a site of extreme Palestinian water vulnerability. 
Evidently, the reason for this is not hydrological, but political.
Water and confl ict
In both Cyprus and Israel–WBG water issues have been and remain a source of political 
discourse and debate, albeit to very different degrees. In Cyprus muted accusations over 
groundwater depletion involve Greek Cypriot claims of Northern water mismanagement, 
countered by Turkish Cypriot references to the RoC’s control over the island’s key recharge 
areas (Ergil, 2000). By contrast, water is a regular subject of strident accusations and 
counteraccusations between Israel and the PA—Palestinian claims centring on Israel’s 
monopoly of transboundary water and its discriminatory water practices, and Israel’s principal 
arguments being that Palestinian water problems are a product of internal PA mismanagement 
and that the Palestinians are pursuing a ‘sewage intifada’ against Israel (GoI, 1998). 
Often, international organisations and NGOs are also participants to these disputes, usually 
siding with the Palestinians (Amnesty International, 2009; World Bank, 2009). All that said, in 
Cyprus and Israel–WBG alike, water issues are very far from being the leading causes or subjects 
of political controversy, as is indicated, for instance, by the limited importance attached to water 
issues within the two peace processes. Joint water management issues played only a minor 
role in the natural resource dimension of the 2004 Annan Plan, while they were intentionally 
relegated during the Oslo peace process to one of the ‘other issues of common interest’ to 
be resolved during permanent status negotiations, secondary to the far more diffi cult issues 
of “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangement, borders, relations and cooperation 
with other neighbours” (GoI and PLO, 1993, article 5); during the actual permanent status talks 
conducted during 2000–01, water issues were barely even addressed (Selby, 2005, page 340).
With regard to violent confl ict specifi cally, Cyprus and Israel–WBG present quite 
different pictures. At no point have water scarcities in Cyprus been a source of large-scale 
intercommunal violence: water was not a factor, for instance, in the Turkish invasion of 
1974. Neither is there any evidence of localised water-related violence in Cyprus between 
(4) See, for example, Fishelson’s comments quoted in Rouyer (2000).
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or within communities in the RoC or Northern Cyprus. By contrast, there is evidence that 
water has been a source of political violence in Israel–WBG and between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours, albeit to a much lesser degree than is often claimed. During 1964–65 Israeli and 
Syrian forces engaged militarily over Arab League plans to divert Jordan River headwaters 
(Lowi, 1995). At a more localised level, there are regular violent skirmishes between and 
within West Bank Palestinian communities, over access to scarce and unevenly distributed 
water supplies (Selby, 2003b). Moreover, the location of some Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank has been infl uenced by Israel’s interest in settling key recharge zones of the Mountain 
Aquifer. These examples are exceptions rather than the rule, however. Despite some claims 
to the contrary (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993, page 34; Naff and Matson, 1984, page 44), the 
1967 Six Day War was not a ‘water war’, driven by confl ict over regional water resources. 
Of the numerous other instances of large-scale violent confl ict discussed above, none has had 
important water-related dimensions. As refl ected in the importance assigned to it during the 
Oslo peace process, water has not been a signifi cant driver of the Israeli–Palestinian confl ict.
The counterthesis that water is associated more with international cooperation than 
with confl ict also fi nds minimal support in Cyprus and Israel-WBG. In Cyprus the RoC’s 
nonrecognition of the Turkish Cypriot administration in the North makes formal cooperation 
all but impossible, though there is informal technical cooperation over wastewater treatment 
(Brouma and Ezel, 2011). In Israel–WBG, while there is some formal policy coordination, 
this is over only West Bank aquifers—where ‘joint management’ functions as a means of 
Israeli veto and an instrument of hegemony or domination—and not at all over the Gaza Strip 
or the Jordan River, for which Israel prefers unilateral management (Selby, 2003a). There is 
also some localised Israeli–Palestinian ‘cooperation’, both between Palestinian communities 
and Israeli settlers (Selby, 2003b, pages 162–163) and across the Green Line. Contrary to 
liberal functionalist expectations (Dolatyar and Gray, 2000, page 84; Wolf, 1995, page 3), 
at no point in either Israel–WBG or Cyprus has water cooperation led or ‘spilled over’ into 
other more delicate areas of peacemaking.
Much more signifi cant than the impact of water in causing or contributing to confl ict have 
been the impacts of confl ict, whether political or violent, in causing or exacerbating water 
problems. These impacts are evident in both Cyprus and Israel–WBG, and are both direct 
and indirect. 
Direct impacts of confl ict are most apparent in Israel–WBG. Water infrastructures have 
sometimes been symbolic targets for attacks, most notably in the Palestinian resistance 
movement Fatah’s fi rst ever raid, in 1964, which was on a water pumping station. More 
commonly, however, infrastructures have been either indiscriminately or intentionally 
damaged during military operations. Israeli actions in the WBG from 2000 to 2004 resulted 
in extensive damage to Palestinian infrastructures and supplies—for instance, in Jenin in 
2002, when as a result of Israeli actions over 15 000 people went without piped supplies 
for a month (Zeitoun, 2008, page 90). Ongoing Israeli restrictions on movement within the 
West Bank, and between the WBG and Israel, often have signifi cant impacts, affecting for 
instance the import of infrastructure parts, water sector personnel, and water tankers. This is 
especially the case in Gaza, which since 2007 has been subject to an Israeli blockade, leading 
to widespread shortages of spare parts and diesel for generators, as well as electricity cuts, all 
of which have affected water and wastewater services (World Bank, 2009, page 29).
The indirect impacts of political and violent confl ict are arguably more telling, however. 
First, many of the water problems discussed above are the direct results of confl ict, this 
being especially true of Gaza’s water crisis (caused in large part by pressures resulting from 
its large refugee population) and West Bank supply shortages (intentionally caused by the 
Israeli authorities). Second, confl ict has had clear economic impacts, at least within Northern 
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Cyprus and the WBG, which in turn have constrained resources available for sustainable 
investment in and management of the water sector. Third, confl ict has negatively affected 
good governance in the water sector: this is especially the case in the WBG, where violent 
confl ict and a halting peace process have impeded sustainable institution building, and in 
Northern Cyprus, where the structural dependence on Turkey, combined with international 
isolation, has left civilian governance institutions extremely weak. Fourth, confl ict has 
constrained opportunities for technical cooperation, with clear impacts on the management 
of transboundary resources in particular. This is especially evident in relation to Gaza’s water 
crisis, over which Israeli–Palestinian cooperation is completely absent, but also applies to 
the transboundary Morphou/Guzelyurt Aquifer. Confl ict and division have also presented 
obstacles to potential transboundary water transfers, preventing the conveyance of water 
from the RoC to the much drier Northern Cyprus, and limiting conveyance from Israel to 
Gaza. Across our two cases the water problems are most severe in the Gaza Strip, the West 
Bank, and Northern Cyprus. Confl ict—and its specifi c structure and dynamics in different 
contexts—is the primary reason for this state of affairs.
Historical particularities aside, there are also more general reasons why water has 
not been a signifi cant source of violent confl ict in Cyprus or Israel–WBG, which contain 
implications for the future. First, although economic development and associated population 
growth typically increase pressure upon water resources, development also furnishes plentiful 
technological, economic, and institutional means for overcoming supply constraints. Second, 
despite its obvious biological and economical value, water is of declining relative economic 
and political importance within most societies. It is widely recognised that agriculturally 
dependent societies are the ones that are most vulnerable to water scarcities and associated 
environmental shocks (Reuveny, 2007, page 661). The logical corollary of this is rarely 
made explicit, however. Owing to economic development, agriculture is now providing 
ever-declining contributions to GDP, employment, and state revenues; and with this the 
political importance of farming lobbies, rural communities, and in turn water is tending in 
most countries to decrease (Selby, 2005, page 336). The consequence of this is that, despite 
resource pressures, violent water confl icts are becoming less rather than more likely, except 
perhaps at a very local level, in marginalised and impoverished rural and urban areas. It is this 
developmental dynamic, at the core, which explains why the only recorded outright water 
war occurred 4500 years ago between two Mesopotamian city-states, and why there have 
been no modern water wars (Wolf, 1998). Given the above, there is no good reason to assume 
that water confl icts are going to become more common or likely in future.
Water, confl ict, and migration
There is little evidence in Cyprus or Israel–WBG to support Malthusian models of 
environment–confl ict–migration interactions. The large-scale population displacements in 
Cyprus (in 1963 and 1974) and Israel–WBG (in 1948–49 and 1967) were not even partly 
caused by water stresses. It is possible that water shortages have been a contributory factor in 
internal migration, including rural–urban migration, in the two case areas, although as noted 
above such internal migration has been quite limited. At the most aggregate level, water 
resource pressures and migration in Cyprus and Israel, far from being positively correlated, 
are actually negatively correlated. For despite increasing pressure on water resources, 
Israel and both parts of Cyprus (but not the WBG, given Israeli restrictions) are areas of net 
immigration. Cyprus, which in the past was a lush island and a net exporter of migrants, is 
now the opposite in both regards.
There is likewise little evidence of water problems causing (either violent or political) 
confl ict and this in turn leading indirectly to migration and further confl ict (fi gure 1). As 
noted above, water has not been a source of intercommunal violence in Cyprus and has 
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only exceptionally been a reason for violence in Israel–WBG—thus rendering it extremely 
unlikely that water-related violence might have contributed to migration. Israeli restrictions 
on Palestinian water development in the West Bank have contributed to some local internal 
displacement (OCHA, 2011), but to our knowledge this is the only evidence across the two 
cases of political confl ict over water contributing to migration.
Moreover, there is little reason to conclude that Cyprus or Israel–WBG have thus far been 
recipients of environmental migrants. International labour migration to Cyprus and Israel has 
been equally from water-scarce and water-abundant states. The largest refugee populations 
in the RoC are from Syria, Iran, and Turkey, which are mostly well endowed (the latter 
very well endowed) with water resources. Refugee fl ows to Israel from East Africa have 
been linked to drought and environmental degradation (IMEP, 2012), but there are no solid 
grounds for characterising such migration as essentially ‘environmental’.
The question of why there has been so little migration as a result of water stresses in 
Cyprus and Israel–WBG demands further attention and cannot be answered conclusively here. 
However, one important reason is that there are many other ways of adapting to environmental 
change and environmental shocks, besides migration. In all water-stretched regions states 
have responded to long-term pressures on water resources through supply-side investment and 
wastewater reuse, as well as by reducing allocations to agriculture, and turning to international 
markets to meet local food requirements. In both the RoC and Israel water managers have 
responded to periodic droughts with short-term reductions in allocations to agriculture, as 
well as by increasing groundwater abstraction during drought years (Zeitoun et al, 2009). 
Farmers in the Famagusta area of Northern Cyprus have responded to the extreme salination 
of the Magosa/Famagusta Aquifer by turning to dry-land farming. West Bank Palestinians 
manage in the face of intermittent domestic supplies through a range of household-level 
supply enhancement and demand management techniques—for instance, using underground 
and roof-top storage systems, increasing consumption of bottled water, and adapting domestic 
washing and cleaning practices (Selby, 2003b, chapter 8). An additional factor may be that 
chronic water problems, such as those in the WBG in particular, may be considered suffi ciently 
normal and routine that they are integrated into everyday life and experiences, rather than 
experienced, like environmental shocks, as extreme events which provide reason to emigrate 
(Cahill-Ripley, 2011). For Palestinians, a further important reason why there is so little out-
migration lies in the fear of losing the right to return to the WBG; and, at a more ideological 
level, in their commitment, which is also present within Zionist thinking, to the political 
importance of maintaining a physical presence within their homeland. 
What, though, of the future? It has been argued above both that water problems in Cyprus 
and Israel–WBG will not necessarily become more severe and that the confl ict potential of 
water is not necessarily increasing (and is in certain respects decreasing). As a corollary, it 
would be fallacious to think that increased water stress will inexorably generate environmental 
migration. Much more likely are continuing asymmetries in water vulnerabilities, without 
these leading to either political violence or migration. 
While migration and confl ict are unlikely consequences of environmental stress in Cyprus 
or Israel–WBG, the converse—that environmental stresses and vulnerabilities are very often 
caused by confl ict and migration—clearly holds true. As noted above, confl ict in these two 
divided territories has, inter alia, created population pressures upon water resources (especially 
in Gaza, as a result of forced displacement), impeded sustainable economic development of 
water resources, as well as strong water sector regulation (especially in Northern Cyprus and 
the WBG), limited opportunities for bilateral and regional cooperation (in both Cyprus 
and Israel–WBG), and involved the intentional limiting of access to water supplies (in the 
West Bank). Moreover, confl ict in both cases has to a signifi cant degree been either caused 
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or exacerbated by migration, especially settlement and forced displacement. All in all, these 
confl ict and migration impacts are many times more signifi cant than any impacts of water 
scarcity in causing or contributing to confl ict and migration in Cyprus and Israel–WBG.
Furthermore, the most extreme ‘environmental migration’ problem found within our case 
studies does not lie in people being forced to move because of environmental stresses, but in people 
being unable to move. This is specifi cally the case within the Gaza Strip, where encirclement by 
Israel plus international policy on Palestinian refugees and Palestinians’ continuing commitment 
to remaining in their homeland impedes the ability of Gazans to leave their tiny territory, leaving 
them imprisoned with mostly undrinkable water supplies. In this sense—and others—Gazans 
constitute a ‘trapped population’ par excellence (Black et al, 2011b). Environmental migration 
is usually depicted within Western policy discourse as a problem and threat. But, as this example 
illustrates, migration is also a potential adaptation strategy—which when denied or prevented 
can cause far graver environmental vulnerability and human insecurity. 
Conclusions
Cyprus and Israel–WBG provide negligible support for the Malthusian thesis that water scarcity 
can cause or contribute to confl ict and migration. Moreover, there is little reason to suppose 
that a Malthusian future lies just over the horizon since, despite likely increasing resource 
pressures plus climate-change-related declines in precipitation, there exist plentiful means of 
adaptation (from importing virtual water to changing agricultural practices and livelihoods), 
and also because water is of declining economic and political value in most societies. That said, 
even within Cyprus and Israel–WBG, some states and populations evidently have far superior 
adaptive capacities than others—for a range of economic, political, and institutional reasons. 
In both cases we fi nd striking asymmetries in water security and vulnerability, refl ecting 
differential adaptive capacities plus also, crucially, long-established confl ict structures and 
power relations. In both cases, moreover, we fi nd that confl ict is the central determinant of 
patterns of water crisis and insecurity. The very different forms taken by water insecurity 
in the two cases—especially its far greater severity in Israel–WBG—is closely correlated 
with the form and intensity of confl ict in each case. And migration has historically been a 
central element of these confl icts. The cases of Cyprus and Israel–WBG, then, suggest the 
alternative model of environment–migration–confl ict linkages shown in fi gure 2.
Of course, neither this model nor our specifi c fi ndings on the two cases are straightforwardly 
generalisable. The small size of Cyprus and Israel–WBG, plus the relative economic prosperity 
of Israel and the RoC, limits the utility of these cases for developing general conclusions 
Figure 2. Environment–migration–confl ict linkages in Cyprus and Israel–WBG.
Confl ict Migration
Environment 
Stress
Water scarcity, confl ict, and migration 1011
about the nature, extent, and causes of environment-related migration. Moreover, in most 
parts of the world political and violent confl ict are not as determining of water problems 
and vulnerabilities as they are in Cyprus and Israel–WBG. That said, given that Cyprus and 
especially Israel–WBG are regular focuses of Malthusian reasoning, the fact that these cases 
provide negligible support for such reasoning is of general signifi cance—corroborating 
extant critiques (Leach and Mearns, 1996; Peluso and Watts, 2001). Equally, the analysis 
above suggests the need for further consideration of the constitutive impacts of confl ict on 
environmental insecurities. For despite its self-evident importance, there exists no sustained 
general literature on this subject. If the cases of Cyprus and Israel–WBG are a good guide, 
analysts should devote far less attention than currently to hypothetical and weakly evidenced 
‘environmental security’ and environmental migration threats, and rather more to the multiple 
effects of confl ict in causing and structuring environmental stresses and vulnerabilities.
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